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The ruling concerns the enforcement of the Com-
mission’s recidivism policy, i.e. taking into account
prior infringements of competition law when cal-
culating the amount of the fine. The ECJ reaf-
firmed the Commission’s discretion in that area by
rejecting any fixed limitation periods and dismiss-
ing the appellant’s argument that Commission’s
prior infringement decisions have to become defi-
nite in order for the Commission to consider the
existence of a repeated infringement.
(1) Facts and Procedure
On 27 February 2002 the Commission adopted its
Plasterboard decision1 establishing that four major
players on the Community plasterboard market
BPB, Knauf Group, Lafarge and Gyproc conspired
to stabilize prices in Germany, France, UK and the
Benelux. The Commission based its conclusion on
various information, exchange arrangements and
subsequent developments (concerted price in-
creases) on the plasterboard markets. The Com-
mission concluded that the undertakings con-
cerned had committed an infringement of
Article 81(1) EC (now Article 101(1) TFEU)
which aimed at putting an end to a price war and
stabilizing the market through exchanges of con-
fidential information. For Lafarge the starting
amount of the fine was set at EUR 52 million,
which was then increased by 100% in order to en-
sure that the fine had a sufficiently deterrent ef-
fect. It was subsequently increased by 60% for the
duration of the infringement and by 50% for ag-
gravating circumstances (repeated infringement)2,
which brought the final amount of the fine im-
posed on Lafarge to EUR 249.6 million. On
14 February 2003 Lafarge challenged the Com-
mission’s decision before the General Court
(GC). The appellant’s claim was based on the al-
leged violation of procedural rights, manifest error
of assessment, and infringement of the general
principles in calculation of the fine. The appeal
was dismissed by the GC.3
In the subsequent appeal of the GC’s judgment
before the Court of Justice (ECJ), Lafarge argued
that the contested judgment was inade-
quately reasoned because the GC failed to ad-
dress the argument raised by Lafarge at first in-
stance relating to the unequal treatment of
Lafarge as compared with Gyproc. Namely, the
appellant noted that while the Commission con-
cluded that reference to Lafarge’s market share in
certain documents presented a sufficient evidence
for proving Lafarge’s participation in a single,
complex and continuous infringement, the same
evidence appeared insufficient in relation to
Gyproc. The Commission claimed that such a plea
was inadmissible because the appellant failed to
raise it at first instance. According to settled case
law, the obligation of the GC to state reasons for
its conclusions cannot be interpreted as requiring
the Court to respond in detail to every single argu-
ment used by the appellant.4 Although the words
«discrimination» or «unequal treatment» were
not used by Lafarge at first instance, AG Mazak
considered that the substance of Lafarge’s claim
was sufficiently clear and should have been ad-
dressed by the GC. The total absence of reasoning
with respect to the question of discrimination, ac-
cording to AG Mazak, constituted a sufficient
E L R 1 0 / 2 0 1 0 no  10
III. Alexandr Svetlicinii, Florence*
Epilogue of the Plasterboard Litigation: How Much Legal
Certainty in the Commission’s Treatment of Repeated
 Infringements?
(Lafarge SA ./. European Commission, ECJ (Second Chamber),
Judgment of 17 June 2010, C-413/08 P)
tion with para. 19; see also Opinion of Advocate General
Bot of 26 January 2010, C-409/06 Winner Wetten GmbH ./.
Bürgermeisterin der Stadt Bergheim, para. 76; ECJ Placanica
et als., supra [Fn. 9], paras. 67 and 69.
21 ECJ Winner Wetten, supra [Fn. 15], para. 71; see also Opin-
ion of Advocate General Bot of 26 January 2010, C-409/06
Winner Wetten, paras 84 and 110 et seq.
22 For example ECJ of 6 November 2003, C-243/01 Gambelli et
al, paras 62 et seq; ECJ Placanica et als., supra [Fn. 9],
para. 53; ECJ [1999] ECR I-7289 Questore di Verona ./.
Diego Zenatti, paras. 35 and 36; see also Talos/Stadler,
WOGLR [4/2009] 12-13.
23 ECJ Markus Stoß et als., supra [Fn. 15], para 103; ECJ of
8 September 2010, Case C-46/08 Carmen Media Ltd ./.
Land Schleswig-Holstein, para. 71.
24 ECJ Markus Stoß et als., supra [Fn. 15], para. 103.
25 See Carmen Media, supra [Fn. 23], para. 71 and answer to
the second preliminary question.
26 Idem., para. 70.
III
W
et
tb
ew
er
bs
re
ch
t
319
no 10
European Law Reporter
ground for setting aside the GC’s judgment be-
cause it did not allow the ECJ to decide whether
the contested judgment is in breach of the prin -
ciple of equal treatment.5
Apart from challenging the Commission’s findings
of the specified infringement, the appellant also
contested the methodology used by the Commis-
sion in setting the amount of the fine; particularly
the increase of the basic amount due to the exis-
tence of a repeated infringement on the part
of Lafarge. Referring to earlier case law,6 the GC
stated that the presence of a repeated infringe-
ment is one of the factors to be taken in to ac-
count when assessing the gravity of an infringe-
ment.7 Lafarge argued that the GC’s approach
infringed the principle of legal certainty by allow-
ing the Commission to sanction the undertakings
for their past behavior without any limitation
period common to the national legal systems of
the Member States. The Commission considered
that such arguments were definitely rejected by
the ECJ in the Danone case.8 In that case the ECJ
agreed with AG Maduro that repeated infringe-
ment is an important factor which the Commis-
sion must appraise, since the purpose of taking re-
peated infringement into account is to induce
undertakings which have demonstrated a tenden-
cy towards infringing the competition rules to
change their conduct.9 The ECJ also emphasized
that the appraisal of the specific characteristics of
a repeated infringement comes within the Com-
mission’s margin of discretion and that the Com-
mission cannot be bound by any limitation peri-
od.10 According to AG Mazak’s understanding of
Danone, the ECJ merely indicated that a static and
inflexible limitation period would undermine the
discretion of the Commission in determining the
amount of fines. At the same time, it should not
mean that undertakings may be punished indefi-
nitely for their past infringements of competition
law.
Another issue raised by the appellant was related
to the way in which the Commission determined
the existence of the repeated infringement. Ac-
cording to the Commission’s decision, the anti-
competitive practices ended in November 1998.
At that time Lafarge had not yet been con-
demned definitively for participation in the
price cartel as the GC had not yet issued its Ci-
menteries CBR judgment, which established that
Lafarge had taken part in an illegal agreement in
the cement sector.11 The GC held that it was suffi-
cient that the undertaking was found guilty of an
infringement of the same type even if the decision
was still subject to review by the Court.12 That
holding was based on the presumption of lawful-
ness that should be accorded to the Commission’s
decisions until they are definitively annulled by the
Court. The GC added that if the first decision pun-
ishing an infringement were to prove unfounded,
that would constitute a new fact causing time for
bringing an appeal to start running again («si la
première décision sanctionnant une infraction se
révélait non fondée, il s’agirait d’un fait nouveau
entraînant la réouverture des délais de recours»).13
The Commission argued that if an action which
was brought against the first decision would pre-
vent the Commission to take into account the «re-
peated infringement» factor, the objectives of the
competition policy would be undermined.14 It dis-
agreed with the GC’s approach and proposed an
alternative scenario for resolution of such cases:
(1) where the first decision finding a breach of
competition law is annulled, the undertaking in
question can ask the Commission to re-examine
the second decision; and (2) a refusal by the Com-
mission to carry out such a re-examination
could be subject to annulment proceedings before
the GC.
In its opinion AG Mazak argued that neither the
Treaty nor any other provisions of EU law provide
for a time limit for an action for annulment of Com-
mission decisions to restart. The solution proposed
by the GC, according to AG Mazak, «would impose
an abnormal and unfair burden on the undertaking
in question and would thus infringe the principle of
sound administration of justice and procedural au-
tonomy».15 The Advocate General concurred with
the appellant and the Commission on the point
that the time for bringing an appeal is fixed by Arti-
cle 230 EC (now Article 263 TFEU) and cannot start
running again. It advised the ECJ to set aside the
GC’s judgment in so far as it rejected Lafarge’s claim
that the Commission had erred in finding that there
was a repeated infringement while its first decision
had not yet become definitive.16
(2) Judgment
In relation to Lafarge’s plea alleging the GC’s fail-
ure to state reasons and breach of the
principle of equal treatment, the ECJ noted
that no allegation as regards breach of the
principle of equal treatment was expressly
pleaded in its application at first instance as sug-
gested by the appellant. Even if such allegation
could be extracted from the wording of the appli-
cation indirectly, «it was neither sufficiently clear
nor precise nor based on detailed evidence intend-
ed to support it».17 The principle of equal treat-
ment requires that comparable situations should
E L R 1 0 / 2 0 1 0
320
European Law Reporter
be treated alike unless there is an objectively justi-
fied reason for derogation from this principle.18
Since in the present case the participation of La-
farge and Gyproc in the infringement was charac-
terized by significant factual differences, the ECJ
stated that it was on Lafarge to show that its situ-
ation was comparable to that of Gyproc.19
As to Lafarge’s claim concerning the absence of
any limitation periods for sanctioning the re-
peated infringement, the ECJ stated that it was
based on an erroneous interpretation of the
Danone judgment. In Danone the ECJ stated that
the absence of such a limitation period does not
infringe the principle of legal certainty.20 Accord-
ing to the Court, Lafarge incorrectly interpreted
this judgment by concluding that it would be pos-
sible for the Commission to increase the fine for
repeated infringement with no limitation in time
for doing so. The ECJ emphasized that the prin -
ciple of proportionality requires the Commission
to take into account the time elapsed between the
infringement in question and the prior infringe-
ment(s) in order to assess the undertaking’s ten-
dency to breach competition rules again.
Thus, instead of relying on a non-existing limita-
tion period, the undertakings sanctioned for com-
petition law violations can argue before the Court
that the Commission did not comply with that
principle. Taking into account the history of the in-
fringements found against Lafarge and the fact
that its subsidiaries continued to participate in the
cartel following the adoption of the first Commis-
sion’s decision, the ECJ concluded that the GC did
not err in law by holding that the principle of legal
certainty was not infringed because there was no
fixed limitation period for considering the repeat-
ed infringements.21
The ECJ also addressed the second heading of La-
farge’s claim concerning the existence of the re-
peated infringement in the absence of a de-
finitive decision in that regard. The ECJ
aligned with the GC on the point that decisions of
the Commission should be presumed lawful
until the time when they are annulled or with-
drawn.22 Furthermore, pursuant to Article 242 EC
(now Article 278 TFEU) actions before the Court
do not have suspensory effect. According to the
ECJ, the acceptance of Lafarge’s argument would
encourage dilatory actions which would be initiat-
ed in order to avoid the consequences of repeated
infringement.23 The ECJ has thus endorsed the
consideration of the «repeated infringement» fac-
tor even if the initial decision is still under review.
The ECJ agreed with the Commission’s statement
that following an annulment of the initial
decision, the Commission, as required by Art -
icle 233 EC (now Article 266 TFEU), has to take
corrective action and amend the fine, which was
calculated taking into account the existence of the
repeated infringement.24 The above solution, ac-
cording to the ECJ, provides a balance between
the interests of the parties and objectives of the
competition policy: (1) correcting measures have
to be taken by the Commission; and (2) purely
dilatory actions for annulment are prevented.25
The ECJ did not address the approach taken by the
GC that the annulment of the initial infringement
decision constitutes a new fact entailing the
recommencement of the time limit for bringing an
appeal in relation to the second decision. The
Court stated that, assuming that the GC erred in
law, such an error cannot lead to the annulment
of the judgment because its operative part is well
founded on other legal grounds.26
(3) Commentary
The epilogue of the Plasterboard litigation27 in the
Lafarge case is notable inter alia for the discussion
on the application of the Commission’s policy on
recidivism in EC competition law. Al-
though in this case the Commission’s methods for
setting the fines were reviewed under Regula-
tion 1728 and the 1998 Guidelines,29 the discussion
on the consideration of repeated infringement as
an aggravating circumstance leading to an in-
crease of the basic amount remains valid under
Regulation 1/200330 and the 2006 Guidelines.31
The wording of the 1998 Guidelines mandated an
increase of the basic amount of the fine for «re-
peated infringement of the same type by the same
undertaking(s)».32 The 2006 Guidelines further ex-
plained that «repeated infringement» means that
the Commission or a national competition author-
ity (NCA) had found earlier that the undertaking in
question infringed Article 81 or 82 EC (now Art -
icles 101 and 102 TFEU).33 In the Lafarge judgment
the ECJ has expressly confirmed that the Commis-
sion’s (or, under the 2006 Guidelines – that of the
NCAs) decision establishing the previous
infringement does not have to be defini-
tive, i.e. the judicial review of the Commission’s
decision does not preclude the Commission from
taking it as a basis for finding the existence of a re-
peated infringement. The ECJ has thus managed
to strike a balance between the need for an expe-
dient antitrust enforcement and prevention of
dilatory tactics on one hand, and procedural rights
of the undertakings on the other. The latter have
to rely on the self-correction mechanism under  
Art icle 266 TFEU. The balanced approach taken by
the ECJ seems to be supported by the litiga-
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tion statistics: during the period of 1998-2009
the fines were appealed in 52 out of the 56 cartel
cases (or 93%) by one or more firms; out of the 32
decided appeals only 3 of the Commission’s deci-
sions were annulled for legal reasons.34 This data
demonstrates that while the likelihood of an ap-
peal is very high, the chances that the Court will
annul the Commission’s finding of an infringe-
ment, at least in cartel cases, are very low. The fact
that in many cases the Court has reduced the fines
initially imposed by the Commission would have
no relevance for establishing the existence of a re-
peated infringement. 
The Lafarge judgment also reflects the Court’s
general approach towards the Commission’s de-
termination of fines, i.e. taking into account vari-
ous attenuating and aggravating circumstances
that can lead to a reduction or an increase of the
basic amount. The appellant had raised the issue
of the period of limitation for considering previ-
ous infringements of EC competition law. It ar-
gued inter alia that the absence of any limitation
period for considering previous infringements
would be contrary to the principle of legal certain-
ty and that Regulation 17 did not empower the
Commission to increase fines for repeated in-
fringements. The same argument could be used in
relation to Regulation 1/2003,35 which was the
basis for adopting the 2006 Guidelines. Both Reg-
ulations mandate the Commission to take into ac-
count the gravity and duration of an infringement.
In its preceding case law cited in the Lafarge case
the ECJ stated that repeated infringement is
among the factors to be taken into consideration
in the analysis of the gravity of the infringement in
question.36 Because it is not entirely clear how the
recidivism as an aggravating factor follows from
the obligation of the Commission to consider the
«gravity» and «duration» of the infringement, it
was argued that the Regulations do not provide
the necessary clear and unambiguous legal basis
for considering repeated infringements.37 Never-
theless, the ECJ confirmed that Regulation 17
(and consequently Regulation 1/2003) constitutes
the relevant legal basis for taking repeated in-
fringement into consideration when calculating
the fine.38
After reaffirming that the Commission is empow-
ered to consider repeated infringements when de-
termining the amount of the fine, the ECJ upheld
its ruling in Danone and emphasized that neither
Regulation 17 nor the 1998 Guidelines prescribe
any maximum period outside which repeated
infringement cannot be taken into account.39 That
should have been expected, however, since nei-
ther of the Regulations contains any references to
the repeated infringement they could not be a
source from which the period of limitation could
be extracted. Both the 1998 and 2006 Guidelines
which specify the consideration of repeated in-
fringements do not contain any limitation periods.
As a result, the Commission’s discretion in consid-
ering past infringements would be limited only
by the general principle of proportional-
ity, whereby in each individual case the Commis-
sion would have to take into consideration the in-
dicia that confirm the offender’s tendency to
infringe competition rules, including the time that
has elapsed between the infringements in ques-
tion.40 The ECJ held that the Commission’s guide-
lines should ensure legal certainty by defining
«the methods which the Commission imposed on
itself in order to set the amount of fines».41 The
Commission’s guidelines, however, do not impose
any periods of limitation or any criteria other than
the maximum percentage for increase of the basic
amount on the ground of a repeated infringe-
ment.42 While the Commission’s practice
might provide some guidance on the relevance of
time periods elapsed between the infringements,
one should note the GC’s statement in Michelin:
«the Commission’s practice in previous decisions
does not itself serve as a legal framework for the
fines imposed in competition matters, since that
framework is defined solely in [the Regulation]
and in the Guidelines».43 The main signal that the
Commission intended to communicate with the
adoption of the 2006 Guidelines was its increased
focus on the economic significance of the in-
fringement and on deterrence. In order to achieve
these objectives, the 2006 Guidelines justify the
increase of the fine for each prior infringement,
which reaffirmed the Commission’s rejection of
any limitation periods. The Lafarge judgment
indicates full support of the Court in relation to
the Commission’s policy on setting the fines based
on a wide discretion of the latter in consider-
ing various aggravating and attenuating factors.
Therefore, offenders with the past history of com-
petition law infringements should expect that
each of their prior infringements might trigger a
100% increase of the basic amount, without
much regard to the timing of the prior infringe-
ments. The only fixed limitation that the Commis-
sion is expected to respect is the cap of 10% of
the offender’s total annual turnover established in
Article 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003. This reinforces
the Commission’s message regarding its stricter
fining policy: «Don’t break the anti-trust rules; if
you do, stop it as quickly as possible, and once
you’ve stopped, don’t do it again».44
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Die Kommission leitete gegen die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland ein Vertragsverletzungsverfahren be-
treffend die betriebliche Altersvorsorge durch Ent-
geltumwandlung nach dem Gesetz über die Ver-
besserung der betrieblichen Altersvorsorge
(BetrAVG) ein. Der EuGH (Gerichtshof) hatte sich
in erster Linie mit der Frage zu befassen, ob und
inwieweit in einem Tarifvertrag1 die Vertragspart-
ner der kommunalen Mitarbeiter für die betriebli-
che Altersvorsorge (Zusatzversorgungseinrichtun-
gen) benannt werden dürfen, ohne diese zuvor in
einem wettbewerblichen Vergabeverfahren ermit-
